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Book Review
Norms of Nature: Naturalism and the Nature of Functions, by Paul Sheldon Davies. Cambridge,
Massachusetts and London, England: MIT Press, 2001. iv + 234 pp. Bibliography and index. ISBN 0-
262-04187-1 (hardback).
How often does a philosophical theory that is scientifically entrenched, manifestly justified, and widely
endorsed and applied by both scientists and philosophers, crumble under its own weight? At least once,
argues Paul Sheldon Davies, in his excellent Norms of Nature. The selective success theory of functions
touts its many boons, all of which turn out to be banes. And Davies’ own systemic capacity theory of
functions stands ready to supplant selective success’s ruination with a new, more reputable account of
functions.
The theory of selected functions is grounded in the theory of natural selection: functional traits are
traits that were selected for. More specifically, a trait has a function just in case ancestral tokens of
that trait performed a certain task, and this enabled organisms possessing that trait to reproduce,
which further enabled the trait to proliferate in the population. In the evolutionary history of
humans, having eyes enabled us to see and to be reproductively successful and, so, having eyes
proliferated. Hence, seeing is the function of human eyes. On this approach, traits have functions in
virtue of their selective history. With the systemic capacity approach to functions, however, a trait’s
history is irrelevant to its functional status. On Davies’ preferred analysis, a trait has a function just
in case it causally contributes to a higher-level capacity of the system to which it belongs. Because
the eye’s seeing contributes to an organism’s capacity to survive and reproduce successfully, the
eye’s function is to see.
Two primary virtues are the pride and joy of the selective success approach. The first virtue is that
selected functions are naturalistic. A trait’s successful selective history generates a function for that
trait and, so, natural selection grounds function attributions. Thus, since the theory of natural
selection is the paradigm of a successful, naturalistic, scientific theory, positing functions on the
basis of selective history yields naturalistic properties underwritten by a wholly naturalistic theory.
The second virtue is that the selected function approach accounts for malfunctioning traits. A
deeply-rooted and widely-held intuition is that some traits malfunction, that, for example, an eye
that cannot see malfunctions. And the selected function approach can place this intuition
theoretically. The human eye was evolutionarily selected for seeing and, so, seeing is the eye’s
proper function; any human eye that cannot see thus malfunctions.
Davies’ attack on the selected function approach targets these two alleged virtues. First, he argues
that selected functions rest upon naturalistically dubious grounds in terms of both ontology and
Essays in Philosophy
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/gilm5276/Desktop/Essays%20HTML/uptonrev.html[9/18/2009 5:10:13 PM]
methodology. In four kinds of case, he claims, biologists posit selected functions in the absence of
a thoroughly naturalistic foothold. Traits acquire functional status (i) in the absence of even indirect
historical evidence, (ii) with no concern for the evolutionary history of the traits involved, and (iii)
in the face of practical difficulties in identifying the causes of selection. Even worse, (iv) selection
acts only upon phenotypes but, yet, biologists attribute functions to genotypes. Thus, because of its
oftentimes wayward application, the selected function approach is not so deeply tied to the theory
of natural selection as it boasts.
This self-aggrandized naturalistic approach to functions faces yet deeper worries, namely, an
outright commitment to non-naturalism. Proponents of the selected function approach claim that
evolutionary history confers a proper function upon a property, but no mechanisms in the processes
comprising natural selection could produce the normativity attaching to selected functions.
Endorsing proper functions drives the approach to non-naturalism.
Moreover, endorsing malfunctions drives the approach to non-naturalism. It is important for the
selected function theorist to uphold the claim that malfunctions can be accounted for, as this is
supposed to be one of the primary virtues of the approach. Now, the approach can endorse one of
two views concerning the conditions under which a trait has a function. Either (i) a trait has a
function just in case it has a successful selective history, or (ii) a trait has a function just in case it
has both a successful selective history and it currently possesses the physical properties required to
perform its selected task. But if something’s having a successful selective history is sufficient for
its having a function, then nothing can malfunction and, so, (i) is unacceptable. Hence, the
approach must endorse (ii). But, then, if an item must possess both the appropriate history and
physical structure, then functional properties are abstract, noncausal properties. This is because
malfunctions obviously lack the requisite physical properties and, so, malfunctions are not
equivalent either to their history or to any physical, causal properties. Malfunctions are, hence,
abstract, noncausal properties, clearly not deserving any piece of the naturalistic pie.
Davies’ second central attack on selected functions’ alleged virtues resides in a simple, yet
powerful, argument that its proponent cannot plausibly endorse malfunctions. The force of the
argument is that the selected function theorist individuates selected traits too coarsely, holding, for
example, that eyes were selected for and, thus, that eyes can malfunction. But Davies perspicuously
points out that only functioning eyes were selected for, as only functioning eyes enabled their
ancestral bearers to survive and successfully reproduce and, thus, enabled the trait to proliferate in
the population. Incapacitated eyes were not selected for, as they did not enable survival,
reproduction, and proliferation. Thus, since eyes gain their functional status on the basis of their
selectively successful history, incapacitated eyes have no functional status at all; they are
nonfunctional. And parallel reasoning applies to all selected traits. Only functioning traits were
selected for; incapacitated traits were not. Thus, all incapacitated traits, which the selected function
theorist wishes to classify as malfunctional, are nonfunctional. The selected function theorist has no
theory-embedded access to malfunctions. The selected function approach boasts of its pride and joy,
its naturalism and its treatment of malfunctions. But its pride and joy is a Rosemary’s baby.
Davies’ systemic capacity approach, he argues, avoids the mistakes that bring to ruin the selected
function approach. First, Davies does not endorse malfunctions so, of course, he avoids the mistake
of trying to account for them. If a trait contributes to a higher-level capacity of the system of which
it is a component, then it is functional relative to that capacity; otherwise, the trait is non-
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functional. Still, however, the intuition that some traits malfunction pervades--what are we to make
of this intuition? Davies suggests that it is merely a psychological byproduct of the expectations we
foist upon internally complex systems. No pressing theoretical need drives us to account for
malfunctions. Furthermore, the systemic capacity approach is naturalistic, as it posits no noncausal,
abstract properties. And Davies holds that there are no proper functions: an item is functional
relative only to the higher-level capacity of a system that interests us. Thus, the account is
naturalistic through and through.
In addition to treating both naturalism and malfunctions more cautiously and, thus, appropriately,
Davies’ approach resourcefully attempts to withstand a prominent objection. Opponents of the
systemic capacity approach argue that it is permissive, as it indiscriminately attributes functions
where, intuitively, there are none. For example, it is intuitively not the heart’s function to vibrate
the sternum. But Davies’ rival may hold that this is, nonetheless, a capacity of the heart and, thus, a
function of the heart. Davies responds that vibrating the sternum is a capacity of the heart, but not a
function of the heart, for a trait is functional only if it contributes to a higher-level capacity of a
system of which it is a component. Vibrating the sternum contributes nothing to any higher-level
capacity of the organism possessing a heart. Davies restricts his account to hierarchically organized
systems, and this move serves to delimit the range of functions the account posits.
And as a final insult to his competitor, Davies notes that the systemic capacity approach both
metaphysically subsumes and methodologically precedes the selective success approach. Any trait
affected by selection can be analyzed in terms of its systemic effects. Further, the systemic function
of a trait guides us to discover historical evidence for its specific selected history; we could not
discover the selected history of a trait without first knowing its systemic function.
Compellingly argued, clearly written, and thoroughly researched, Norms of Nature merits intense
study. Still, however, Davies leaves three striking gaps in his case for the systemic capacity
approach. The first main weakness in Davies’ case is that he much too quickly discounts
malfunctions, ultimately jettisoning them as psychological epiphenomena. But at least two
alternative accounts of malfunctions are available to Davies and the systemic capacity approach.
First, an organism might malfunction relative to other members of its kind, so long as kind
membership is determined independent of an organism’s possessing the salient trait. Suppose that
most members of a kind possess a trait that enables a higher-level capacity. Any organism
belonging to the kind but, yet, lacking that enabling trait may be said to malfunction relative to the
other members of the kind. Nothing Davies says against malfunctions prevents his so understanding
and endorsing malfunctions.
As a second strategy for endorsing malfunctions, note that an organism may possess a trait that
enables a higher-level capacity but, then, lose that functioning to some degree. Relative to its prior
functioning, the organism’s trait may be said to malfunction since it no longer performs its function
as well as it used to. Davies claims in a footnote that this possibility is opened up only if we
misunderstand how properly to individuate functions. A heart may lose its ability to function at full
capacity but, he asserts, “it is likely that the [heart’s] function is to pump blood at a certain rate and
with certain force depending on a variety of conditions internal and external to the organism.” (p.
197) If this is so, then if a heart is not pumping at a specific rate and force, then it is simply
nonfunctioning—it is not malfunctioning. But Davies cannot so narrowly individuate functions. If a
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heart’s function is so specific, then functional types will (probably) be unique to individual
organisms, for the relevant rate, force, and internal and external factors will be specific to individual
organisms. And if an individual organism’s heart possesses a certain function, virtually no
individual in its selective past will have possessed that very function. Thus, by positing narrowly-
individuated functions, Davies’ systemic capacity approach cannot account for traits’ selective
history. And this is a problem because one of the virtues of Davies’ approach is supposed to be that
it metaphysically and methodologically subsumes the selective success approach.
The second main weakness of the systemic capacity approach is that Davies restricts it to
hierarchically organized systems, so that it can avoid indiscriminately positing intuitively
nonfunctional properties. But what are Davies’ reasons for so restricting functions? First, he argues
that “restricting the theory to hierarchically organized systems provides resources with which to
distinguish the functional from the merely causal” (p. 86). Second, “…many natural phenomena are
in fact hierarchically organized…A theory designed to uncover the operations of such layered
systems is a desirable theory.” (87) Third, “Conceptualizing [a] system in terms of a hierarchy of
levels facilitates inquiry into capacities at levels not directly accessible.” (p. 87) And, finally,
“Experts in a given domain recognize and remember domain-specific information on the basis of
hierarchically derived patterns.” (p. 88)
But all four arguments are consistent with the selective success approach to functions. The systemic
capacity approach may well provide resources with which to distinguish the functional from the
merely causal, but so does the selective success approach. And many natural phenomena are,
indeed, hierarchically organized, but many natural phenomena are also evolutionarily selected; if it
is a virtue of an account of functions that it reflect the structure of the natural world, then the two
approaches are equivocal. Next, a proponent of the selective success approach could acknowledge,
and inquire into, the hierarchical structure of many natural phenomena but, yet, still posit functions
on the basis of a phenomenon’s selective history. Finally, experts may recognize and remember
hierarchical patterns but, still, posit selective functions.
The third main weakness in Davies’ case is that he fails to consider more charitable versions of the
selective success approach as viable competitors. The central downfalls of the selective success
approach, Davies argues, are that it claims to account for malfunctions but, yet, malfunctions are
not even possible and, second, that it claims to be thoroughly naturalistic but, yet, it is not. But the
selective success approach’s non-naturalism results primarily from its purporting to account for
malfunctions. Is there any reason a proponent of selective success couldn’t simply abandon the
claim to accounting for malfunctions and, thereby, evade susceptibility to Davies’ two central
objections?
Davies fails to capitalize on these opportunities to strengthen his account. Nonetheless, these
shortcomings do not detract from the overall force of the book. Norms of Nature possesses a
stunning rigor of argumentation, clarity of writing and explanation, and breadth and depth of
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